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A  SCAPEGOAT  THEORY  OF BIVENS
Katherine Mims Crocker*
Some scapegoats are innocent.  Some warrant blame, but not the amount they are made to
bear.  Either way, scapegoating can allow in-groups to sidestep social problems by casting blame
onto out-groups instead of confronting such problems—and the in-groups’ complicity in perpetu-
ating them—directly.
This Essay suggests that it may be productive to view the Bivens regime’s rise as countering
various exercises in scapegoating and its retrenchment as constituting an exercise in scapegoat-
ing.  The earlier cases can be seen as responding to social structures that have scapegoated racial,
economic, and other groups through overaggressive policing, mass incarceration, and inequitable
government conduct more broadly.  The later cases can be seen as scapegoating the earlier cases.
Current Justices condemn their predecessors’ work as legislating from the bench while seeming to
do the same in and beyond the Bivens context.  The Supreme Court thus makes a convenient
sacrifice of caselaw that its majority appears to oppose on ideological grounds.  And it does so
while arguably continuing the supposedly errant conduct depicted as justifying the ritual in the
first place—and while potentially discouraging the forces of political change from pushing Con-
gress to get involved.
The Essay closes by contending that legislative intervention could break the scapegoating
cycle and by discussing some steps the legal community could take to advance that aim.
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1944 R
I. EARLY CASES AS A RESPONSE TO SCAPEGOATING . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1946 R
A. Bivens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1947 R
B. Carlson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1951 R
C. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1953 R
II. LATER CASES AS AN INSTANCE OF SCAPEGOATING . . . . . . . . . . . . 1956 R
A. Convenience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1956 R
B. Concealment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1960 R
C. Correction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1966 R
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1969 R
© 2021 Katherine Mims Crocker.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may
reproduce and distribute copies of this Essay in any format at or below cost, for
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the
Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Assistant Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School.  For generous
conversations and comments, thank you to Aaron Bruhl, Brandon Hasbrouck, Alli Orr
Larsen, Bill Mims, Alex Reinert, and Joanna Schwartz.  I am also grateful to the editors of
the Notre Dame Law Review for the opportunity to participate in this symposium’s
presentation and publication.
1943
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-5\NDL508.txt unknown Seq: 2 11-MAY-21 9:03
1944 notre dame law review [vol. 96:5
INTRODUCTION
On May 16, 1993, Guido Calabresi, then the dean of Yale Law School
(now a senior judge on the Second Circuit), delivered a thoughtful com-
mencement address at Quinnipiac University School of Law.1  The theme
was scapegoats.
Calabresi recounted the story of Eddie Slovik, an army private whom the
United States executed by firing squad in the waning months of World War II
for running away from his unit.2  More than 21,000 members of the Ameri-
can military were convicted of abandoning their units during World War II.3
But Slovik was the only one put to death for his crime.  Indeed, he remains
the only American subjected to capital punishment for desertion since the
Civil War.4
Why was Slovik singled out?  In Calabresi’s telling: “The Army decided
that it was necessary to make an example, because if this sort of thing could
happen, the war could be lost,” and then-General Dwight D. Eisenhower
allegedly said, “pick me a loser.”5  Having narrowed the pool down to several
soldiers who had left their stations twice, Calabresi continued, the Army “sent
in psychologists to interview the double deserters and came up with Eddie
Slovik, who came from someplace in the middle west, did not seem to have
any family, had perhaps been a petty thief before going into the army,” and
was considered “a loser.”6  As Slovik himself reportedly put it: “They’re not
shooting me for deserting the United States Army—thousands of guys have
done that.  They’re shooting me for bread I stole when I was twelve years
old.”7
Slovik, in Calabresi’s version of the story, seems to have been a scape-
goat.  Students of the Bible may be familiar with the literal scapegoat from
the Old Testament, which foreshadowed Jesus’s death in the Gospels.  In
Leviticus, God instructed Moses that his brother Aaron, the high priest,
should select a live goat and “confess over it all the wickedness and rebellion
of the Israelites—all their sins—and put them on the goat’s head.”8  Aaron,
1 See Guido Calabresi, Speech, Scapegoats, 14 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 83, 83 (1994).  At the
time, the institution was called Quinnipiac College School of Law.
2 Id. at 83–84.
3 See Rob Warden & Daniel Lennard, Death in America Under Color of Law: Our Long,
Inglorious Experience with Capital Punishment, 13 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 194, 232 (2018).
4 See WILLIAM BRADFORD HUIE, THE EXECUTION OF PRIVATE SLOVIK 6 (Dell Publ’g Co.
1970) (1954) (stating that “since 1864,” Slovik was “the only American to be executed for
such an offense”); Matthew Wills, On Military Desertion and Executions, JSTOR DAILY (May 1,
2015), https://daily.jstor.org/on-military-desertion-and-executions/ (stating that “no
American has been executed for desertion since U.S. Army Private Eddie Slovik in 1945”).
5 Calabresi, supra note 1, at 84.
6 Id.
7 HUIE, supra note 4, at 18.  For a competing narrative about what led to Slovik’s
execution based on the decision-making record, see Joseph Connor, Who’s to Blame for
Private Eddie Slovik’s Death?, HISTORYNET (Aug. 2018), https://www.historynet.com/whos-
to-blame-for-private-eddie-sloviks-death.htm.
8 Leviticus 16:21 (New International Version).
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God said, should then “send the goat away into the wilderness,” where it
would “carry on itself all [the Israelites’] sins to a remote place.”9  Other
cultures have apparently embraced similar rituals too.10
People may feel the most pity for human scapegoats that, like the animal
ones of old, are innocent of the misdeeds they are made to bear.  As Cala-
bresi put it, scapegoating “can become the pogrom: racial, religious, ethnic,
and put the blame on some group of innocent people.”11  From the Chosen
One in Igor Stravinsky’s ballet The Rite of Spring to Tessie Hutchinson in Shir-
ley Jackson’s short story “The Lottery” to Rue in Suzanne Collins’s book
series The Hunger Games and so many more, innocent scapegoats have cap-
tured modern audiences’ imaginations.12  But scapegoats are not always
innocent.  Like Slovik (incidentally the subject of a 1974 made-for-television
movie starring Martin Sheen), scapegoats may be guilty of the crime for
which they are punished—but so may many others for whom the scapegoat’s
penalty provides symbolic exculpation.13  To borrow again from both life and
television (this time an acclaimed 2019 miniseries), consider the criminal
convictions of a handful of midlevel bureaucrats for the 1986 Chernobyl
nuclear meltdown, a disaster that subsequent analysis attributed to higher
and broader causes within the Soviet system too.14
9 Leviticus 16:21–22 (New International Version).
10 See Bradley C. Bobertz, Legitimizing Pollution Through Pollution Control Laws: Reflections
on Scapegoating Theory, 73 TEX. L. REV. 711, 717 (1995) (“[A]nthropologists have catalogued
a remarkable variety of sacrifice rituals intended to expel collective sin.  Despite subtle
variations in form and emphasis, these ceremonies follow a remarkably similar pattern: the
participants view the ritual as a necessary measure for expelling collective wrongdoing,
often after some misfortune or calamity has befallen the community.  Often, both the
transference of the community’s sins to the scapegoat object and the sacrifice of the object
itself are performed by persons having special standing in the community, typically of a
religious character.”  (footnotes omitted)); id. at 717 n.27 (“Objects used to embody evil in
these rituals include sticks, stones, leaves, fig branches, chickens, wild boars, dogs, cattle,
sheep, effigies of demons and witches, and human beings.”).
11 Calabresi, supra note 1, at 85.
12 Probably less well known than examples like these, but always the most striking to
me, is the unnamed child in Ursula K. Le Guin’s composition The Ones Who Walk Away from
Omelas. See Ursula K. Le Guin, The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas, in 3 NEW DIMENSIONS
1 (Robert Silverberg ed., 1973), reprinted in URSULA K. LE GUIN, THE WIND’S TWELVE
QUARTERS 275 (1975).
13 See Bobertz, supra note 10, at 717 n.30 (stating that in anthropological studies,
“[o]ften, as in the Levitical rites and Christian theology, the sacrificial person or entity
embodies purity or innocence, the opposite qualities of the sin requiring expulsion,” but
that “in many other rites, the sacrificial entity is seen as the cause of the problem itself,”
with “[i]ts destruction or banishment directly remov[ing] the evil, thus cleansing the com-
munity of misfortune and returning affairs to the previous status quo”).
14 See Int’l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], The Chernobyl Accident: Updating of INSAG-1,
at 23–24, IAEA Doc. Safety Series No. 75-INSAG-7 (Nov. 1992) (“The accident can be said
to have flowed from deficient safety culture, not only at the Chernobyl plant, but through-
out the Soviet design, operating and regulatory organizations for nuclear power that
existed at the time.”), https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/
Pub913e_web.pdf.
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Scapegoats have appeared across the ages and in myriad manifestations.
They exist in actuality and in art.  Scholars contend that scapegoats also per-
meate the law, both in terms of problems at which legal interventions are
aimed and in terms of the purposes and impacts of legal interventions them-
selves.15  Inspired by Calabresi’s commentary (rather than deriving from any
expertise in religion, literature, or the social sciences that have considered
the concept in a more specialized light), this Essay explores two ways in
which the scapegoating idea may intersect with the focus of this symposium
issue, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics.16  The
first relates to the Bivens regime’s rise, which allowed plaintiffs to seek money
damages from individual federal officials for certain constitutional violations,
and the second relates to the Bivens regime’s retrenchment.  In particular,
the Essay explores the possibility that the Bivens regime’s beginnings coun-
tered various exercises in scapegoating and that the Bivens regime’s abate-
ment constitutes an exercise in scapegoating.  As part of the latter discussion,
the Essay also proposes a potential corrective course.
Part I examines how the earlier cases can be seen as responding to social
structures that have scapegoated racial, economic, and other groups through
overaggressive policing, mass incarceration, and inequitable government
conduct more broadly.  Part II examines how the later cases can be seen as
scapegoating the earlier cases.  Current Justices condemn their predecessors’
work as supposedly legislating from the bench while seeming to do the same
in and beyond the Bivens context.  The Supreme Court thus makes a conve-
nient sacrifice of caselaw that its majority appears to oppose on ideological
grounds.  And it does so while arguably continuing the supposedly errant
conduct depicted as justifying the ritual in the first place—and while poten-
tially discouraging the forces of political change from pushing Congress to
get involved.  Part II closes by contending that legislative intervention could
break the scapegoating cycle and by discussing some steps the legal commu-
nity could take to advance that aim.
I. EARLY CASES AS A RESPONSE TO SCAPEGOATING
  According to Judge Calabresi, scapegoating’s core lies in “blaming some-
one, rather than facing up to the underlying problem.”17  A visionary of tort
law, Calabresi started there.  “[W]e always think that accidents are due to
somebody drinking, or to somebody speeding, or to somebody having bad
brakes,” he said.18  “The fact that they almost always happen at the same
15 See generally Calabresi, supra note 1.  For some additional examples of commentators
asserting connections between scapegoating and the law, see generally Bobertz, supra note
10 (environmental regulation); Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for
Solidarity Through Modern Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829 (2000) (criminal sentencing);
and Katie Rose Guest Pryal, Heller’s Scapegoats, 93 N.C. L. REV. 1439 (2015) (civil commit-
ment and gun control).
16 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
17 Calabresi, supra note 1, at 86.
18 Id. at 85.
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curve, at the same exit, or are made worse because we do not have airbags, is
not what we focus on.”19  For “[i]t is much easier to say, ‘it is that person’s
fault; he or she was the one who was responsible for the thing.’”20  And while
“to some degree it is true,” he concluded, it can also become trite.21  Ever
heard that “[g]uns do not kill, people do”?22
As another legal scholar puts it, “The essence of scapegoating is the
attempt to identify the sources of social problems as external to the group.”23
The crux of the practice is “a tendency to blame . . . problems on easily
identifiable objects or entities rather than on the social and economic prac-
tices that actually produce them,” such that “[o]nce identified as the cul-
prit . . . , this blame-holder comes to symbolize and embody the problem
itself.”24  Scapegoating, then, shifts fault for complex social challenges from
in-groups to out-groups, and it should come as little surprise that disadvan-
taged populations may often bear the brunt of this inclination.  The present
Part suggests that it may be productive to view the Bivens regime’s rise as a
response to this phenomenon.
A. Bivens
  Webster Bivens asserted that federal agents “entered his apartment and
arrested him for alleged narcotics violations,” “manacled” him “in front of his
wife and children,” “threatened to arrest the entire family,” “searched the
apartment from stem to stern,” and hauled him “to the federal courthouse in
Brooklyn, where he was interrogated, booked, and subjected to a visual strip
search.”25  Bivens’s complaint alleged that the agents did all this without a
search warrant or an arrest warrant and that they employed excessive force.26
“[F]airly read,” the Supreme Court said, the complaint also alleged a
lack of probable cause.27  But as Jim Pfander explains in his masterful telling
of the story behind the case, Bivens was “involved in drug trafficking at the
time of the arrest and search of his apartment.”28  Indeed, he was “impris-
oned on a federal narcotics conviction” when he filed suit against the
officers.29  And the raid took place on the advice of an Assistant U.S. Attor-
ney who, according to one of the defendants, knew that “two different work-
19 Id. 85–86.
20 Id. at 86.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Kennedy, supra note 15, at 833.
24 Bobertz, supra note 10, at 716.




28 James E. Pfander, The Story of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 275, 291 (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Res-
nik eds., 2010).
29 Id. at 293.
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ing groups of federal agents had bought drugs from Bivens in separate
undercover operations.”30
Given all this, one might regard what happened to Bivens as “routine.”31
But the Court saw something larger than Bivens the man in Bivens the mat-
ter, which it decided in 1971.  The Court saw allegations that spoke to prob-
lematic police conduct more broadly.  “An agent acting—albeit
unconstitutionally—in the name of the United States possesses a far greater
capacity for harm than an individual trespasser exercising no authority other
than his own,” said Justice Brennan’s majority opinion,32 citing cases
throughout involving assertions of improper searches and seizures by federal
officials.33  Chief Justice Burger’s dissent also acknowledged that “[b]eyond
doubt the conduct of some officials requires sanctions”—pointing to “cases
like Irvine [v. California],”34 which involved police officers repeatedly making
warrantless entries to install listening devices in a suspect’s home.35
In Bivens, the Court must have also seen allegations that echoed the
treatment of James Monroe, a black man who was actually blameless of the
crime that law enforcement officers cited when raiding his home and round-
ing up his family36—and whose 1961 civil rights case likewise provided an
occasion to expand the constitutional tort system considerably.37
“[A]ssuming Bivens’ innocence of the crime charged,” said Justice Harlan’s
concurrence shortly after referencing Monroe v. Pape, “[f]or people in [his]
shoes, it is damages or nothing.”38  As Pfander explains, “In emphasizing the
importance of damages as a remedy for people in Bivens’ shoes, Justice
Harlan was adverting to the well-pleaded shoes that Bivens wore in his 1967
complaint, rather than to the literal shoes he wore in the apartment in
November 1965.”39  And even while dissenting from the Court’s decision to
recognize a cause of action under the Fourth Amendment without congres-
sional input, Chief Justice Burger likewise observed that damages relief
30 Id. at 291–92.
31 Id. at 294.
32 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392.
33 See id. at 392–96 (citing, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Bell v.
Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927); Amos v. United
States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)).
34 Id. at 415 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
35 See Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 130–32 (1954).
36 See Myriam E. Gilles, Police, Race and Crime in 1950s Chicago: Monroe v. Pape as Legal
Noir, in CIVIL RIGHTS STORIES 41, 48–52 (Myriam E. Gilles & Risa L. Goluboff eds., 2008)
(explaining how the murder victim’s wife blamed the crime on “two ‘young Negroes’”;
picked James Monroe’s picture out of a mugshot lineup; and was later given up by her
boyfriend, who admitted to being the triggerman, “for planning the entire thing in order
to collect on her husband’s $25,000 life insurance policy”).
37 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961) (holding that state and local officials
can be liable for conduct committed “under color of” state law within the meaning of 42
U.S.C. § 1983, even where their conduct violates state law).
38 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
39 Pfander, supra note 28, at 295.
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“would have the . . . advantage of providing some remedy to the completely
innocent persons who are sometimes the victims of illegal police conduct.”40
Perhaps in all this the Court foresaw the ill effects the “War on Drugs,”
which the Nixon Administration was ramping up in earnest when Bivens
came down in 1971,41 would inflict on communities of color and low-income
people across the country.42  Or, just a few years past a wave of deadly riots
and the ensuing Kerner Report, maybe the Justices had in mind the ways that
various police forces had mistreated disadvantaged populations from coast to
coast.43 Bivens came down in the early days of the Burger Court, but the
majority’s composition (in order of seniority, Justices Douglas, Harlan, Bren-
nan, Stewart, White, and Marshall) harkened back to the preceding era.
“[T]he Warren Court turned to the special magic of the criminal courtroom
to demonstrate its commitment to racial justice, economic equality, and lim-
ited government.”44 Bivens looks like an instance of holdover Justices doing
something similar in a closely related context while opposed by President
Nixon’s recently minted “law-and-order” nominees (Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Blackmun, dissenting alongside Justice Black).45
40 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 422 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
41 See Corey Rayburn Yung, The Emerging Criminal War on Sex Offenders, 45 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 435, 435–36 (2010) (“In 1971, Richard Nixon officially declared the War on
Drugs in America.  However, laws enabling that criminal war were enacted years before
Nixon’s speech formally initiated the new conflict.  In 1968, Lyndon Johnson established
the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, which came to be known as the Drug
Enforcement Agency . . . , to lead the charge against domestic drug use and distribu-
tion. . . . When Nixon took over the Presidency, he signed into law the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, which established the categorization system for
regulating drugs. . . . By the time of Nixon’s official declaration, the War on Drugs was
substantially underway.”  (footnotes omitted)).
42 See Paul Butler, One Hundred Years of Race and Crime, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1043, 1048 (2010) (“The discriminatory results of the drug war are clear.  Three-fourths of
those imprisoned for drug offenses are black or Latino.  In seven states, 80% to 90% of
imprisoned drug offenders are black.  Such disparities cannot be explained by dispropor-
tionate use of drugs by African Americans; blacks don’t use drugs more than any other
group, and some studies have even found that they use them less.” (footnotes omitted));
Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Who Locked Us Up? Examining the Social Meaning of Black Puni-
tiveness, 127 YALE L.J. 2388, 2400 (2018) (reviewing JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR
OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA (2017)) (“As many commentators have
demonstrated, the ‘War on Drugs’ has severely impacted ‘low-income African American
communities.’” (quoting FORMAN, supra, at 17)).
43 See NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIV. DISORDERS, THE KERNER REPORT 301, 301–03
(Princeton Univ. Press 2016) (1968) (“In Newark, Detroit, Watts, and Harlem—in practi-
cally every city that has experienced racial disruption since the summer of 1964, abrasive
relationships between police and Negroes and other minority groups have been a major
source of grievance, tension, and, ultimately, disorder.”).
44 Louis Michael Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Con-
tinuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 436, 442 (1980) (footnotes
omitted).
45 See Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Bur-
ger Courts’ Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 192 (1983) (“Liberal defenders of the War-
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What does all this say about scapegoating?  As Calabresi put it, “we exe-
cute drug dealers, but do not really do much about drugs.”46  Some scholars
have characterized American drug policy in the late twentieth century as “a
clear case of state-power-maintenance through scapegoating” of “convenient
minorities.”47  And even before that, police abuses contributed to black com-
munities suffering from conflicts that commentators trace at least in part to
white populations’ unwillingness to reckon with demographic change.48
Accordingly, one could see Bivens as responding to public scapegoating of
vulnerable populations through swaths of the criminal justice system.  Or,
importantly, even if one doubts that the Court originally conceptualized Biv-
ens in that light, one could still see “the continued force . . . of Bivens in the
search-and-seizure context in which it arose,”49 especially among lower
courts, as responding to concerns like these as they became clearer over time.
While civil liability in itself cannot get at the roots of problems as complex as
the drug epidemic and structural racism, the Court in allowing Bivens claims
opened up an avenue for ameliorating these issues’ inequitable effects.
These impressions are speculative and contestable, of course, and I offer
them in a tentative form.  One might think that other cases from around the
same time that permitted problematic police practices—like Terry v. Ohio50
and Schneckloth v. Bustamonte51—provide counterevidence.52  And Bivens
occurred toward the beginning of the War on Drugs, before the most puni-
ren Court’s legacy feared that President Nixon would fulfill his campaign pledge to
appoint ‘law and order’ Justices who would narrow the scope and practical effect of
landmark decisions . . . .  Nixon fueled these fears of a conservative ‘counter-revolution’
when he appointed Warren Burger as the new Chief Justice.  Indeed, Nixon made it clear
to the public that Burger’s conservative views about law and order were the prime reason
for his appointment to the Court.  By 1972, Nixon had appointed four Justices (Burger,
Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist) . . . .”  (footnotes omitted)).
46 Calabresi, supra note 1, at 86.
47 David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729, 1750 (1993);
see also James Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim Crow, 87
N.Y.U. L. REV. 21, 25–27 (2012) (providing a brief history of the widespread “analogy
between today’s criminal justice system and Jim Crow”).
48 See Gilles, supra note 36, at 42–46.
49 Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1856 (2017).
50 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (holding that police officers may stop and frisk suspects with-
out a warrant on reasonable suspicion that they are involved in criminal activity and may be
armed).
51 412 U.S. 218, 234 (1973) (holding that “proof of knowledge of a right to refuse” is
not “the sine qua non of an effective consent to a search”).
52 In Terry, however, the Court noted “[t]he wholesale harassment by certain elements
of the police community, of which minority groups, particularly Negroes, frequently com-
plain” and stated that “[u]nder our decision, courts still retain their traditional responsibil-
ity to guard against police conduct which is overbearing or harassing, or which trenches
upon personal security without the objective evidentiary justification which the Constitu-
tion requires.”  392 U.S. at 14–15. And the majority in Schneckloth (Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Stewart, White, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist) shared only two members with
the majority in Bivens.
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tive aspects of the movement arose.53  In any event, scapegoating concerns
may have embodied a relatively minor motivation for the Court, which cer-
tainly cared about other factors (including the relationship between rights
and remedies on which the opinion focused) as well.  The point here is to
call attention to an underappreciated strand of thought that may have played
a role in the Bivens decision—and that may in any event help explain its
narrow persistence into the present.
B. Carlson
We can view Carlson v. Green54 and Davis v. Passman55—the other two
cases in which the Supreme Court recognized damages actions against fed-
eral officials for constitutional violations—in a similar light. Carlson (decided
in 1980) postdates Davis (1979) but shares more in common with Bivens itself
and is therefore worth discussing first.  In Carlson, a deceased federal
inmate’s mother sued prison officials under the Eighth Amendment on the
ground that they were aware her son suffered from chronic asthma but failed
to treat his condition appropriately, causing his death.56
Four years before deciding Carlson, the Court held in Estelle v. Gamble
that officials’ “deliberate indifference” to prisoners’ “serious medical needs”
violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual pun-
ishments.57  The Court explained this rule by stating that “denial of medical
care may result in pain and suffering which no one suggests would serve any
penological purpose.”58  In doing so, the Court recognized that society incar-
cerates individuals deemed to deserve some punishment.  But the Court
simultaneously sought to prevent exposing prisoners to harsher conditions
than their crimes warranted and thus sought to avoid “mak[ing] the guilty
ones into scapegoats,”59 which would represent a paradigmatic problem of
the kind Calabresi identified.60
Carlson advanced this cause, holding that the possibility of plaintiffs
receiving redress from the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act
53 See German Lopez, Was Nixon’s War on Drugs a Racially Motivated Crusade?  It’s a Bit
More Complicated., VOX (Mar. 29, 2016), https://www.vox.com/2016/3/29/11325750/
nixon-war-on-drugs (“Nixon’s drug war was largely a public health crusade—one that
would be reshaped into the modern, punitive drug war we know today by later administra-
tions, particularly President Ronald Reagan.”).
54 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
55 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
56 Carlson, 446 U.S. at 16 n.1.
57 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
58 Id. at 103.
59 Calabresi, supra note 1, at 87.
60 As Estelle recognized, the Court had long held that the Eighth Amendment “pros-
cribes punishments grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime.”  429 U.S. at 103
n.7 (first citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (joint opinion); and then citing
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910)).  By focusing on whether the effects of
inadequate medical care serve “any penological purpose,” Estelle connected up with this
precedent.
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(FTCA) did not prevent courts from recognizing an implied cause of action
against individual officials under the Constitution.61  This aspect of the deci-
sion rested on the notion that compensating prisoners for harms suffered
through unconstitutional actions did not go far enough.  Instead, the Court
concluded it was critical to establish a remedy that would have meaningful
deterrent consequences, reasoning that a Bivens claim provided superior
incentives to an FTCA action.  “It is almost axiomatic that the threat of dam-
ages has a deterrent effect,” the Court said—and “surely particularly so when
the individual official faces personal financial liability.”62  Moreover, the
Court said, the unavailability of punitive damages made an FTCA suit “that
much less effective than a Bivens action as a deterrent to unconstitutional
acts.”63
Academic analysis indicates that the Court’s assumptions about how
deterrence works in damages suits against government actors were highly
questionable,64 with several commentators (including me) calling for
increased entity liability as a means of bringing about institutional change.65
Nevertheless, by focusing on deterrence in the first place, the Court targeted
a classic scapegoating scenario, attempting to force federal officials to grap-
ple with difficult problems regarding how to respond to serious medical
needs within a custodial environment rather than just brushing the problems
aside as bad things that happen to imprisoned people.  By analogy to Cala-
bresi’s commencement speech, Carlson tried to compel officials to address
“grade crossings at which trains run into cars with monotonous regularity”
61 Carlson, 446 U.S. at 20.
62 Id. at 21.
63 Id. at 22.  The Court also addressed the counterargument “that FTCA liability is a
more effective deterrent because the individual employees responsible for the Govern-
ment’s liability would risk loss of employment and because the Government would be
forced to promulgate corrective policies.” Id. at 21 (footnote omitted).  This contention,
the Court said, suggests “that the superiors would not take the same actions when an
employee is found personally liable for violation of a citizen’s constitutional rights.” Id.
The Court concluded that “[t]he more reasonable assumption is that responsible superiors
are motivated not only by concern for the public fisc but also by concern for the Govern-
ment’s integrity.” Id.
64 See, e.g., James E. Pfander, Alexander A. Reinert & Joanna C. Schwartz, The Myth of
Personal Liability: Who Pays When Bivens Claims Succeed, 72 STAN. L. REV. 561, 578–80 (2020)
(compiling evidence that certain federal officials are almost always indemnified by their
government employers); Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885,
912–17 (2014) (same for certain state and local officials); see also Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths
and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA
L. REV. 1023, 1028 (2010) (arguing that while policy-level deterrence is possible under
certain circumstances, government entities typically fail to collect or analyze information
about constitutional tort suits in ways that would foster such changes).
65 See generally, e.g., Katherine Mims Crocker, Qualified Immunity, Sovereign Immunity,
and Systemic Reform, 71 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2022) (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3796337) (advocating greater federal, state, and local entity liabil-
ity on multiple grounds).
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rather than allowing them just to say that “somebody always did something
wrong or they would not have gotten crushed.”66
A broader scapegoating situation also loomed behind Carlson.  While the
allegations underlying Bivens illustrate some effects of tough-on-crime poli-
cymaking on front-end investigation, the allegations underlying Carlson illus-
trate some effects of tough-on-crime policymaking on back-end
incarceration.  In Carlson, the plaintiff raised not only a deliberate indiffer-
ence claim under the Eighth Amendment, but also an equal protection claim
under the Fifth Amendment, asserting that the defendants’ “indifference was
in part attributable to racial prejudice.”67  The Court barely mentioned this
allegation, but the plaintiff’s brief provides additional context.  The plain-
tiff’s son was the fourth inmate, the brief says, to die “from medical care
inadequacies in a seven-month period.”68  And all four of the deceased pris-
oners were black.69
Beyond Carlson, the mass incarceration arising from the War on Drugs
would impose strikingly disproportional effects on black Americans.  A 2008
study showed that, as of 1978, black people constituted approximately 20 per-
cent of adult drug arrestees in the United States.70  By 1989, the black “share
among all arrestees exceeded 40 percent,” and in the years since, the figure
has “fluctuat[ed] between 32 and 40 percent.”71  For comparison purposes,
between 1980 and 1990, black people made up roughly 12 percent of the
population,72 and in 2010, the proportion had risen to about 14 percent.73
Just as with Bivens, then, there are reasons to view Carlson—either ini-
tially or in its enduring effects—as responding to public scapegoating of
marginalized communities through aspects of the criminal justice field.
C. Davis
Davis is different from Bivens and Carlson in that it does not directly
implicate the criminal justice system.  But the case may still fit within a
scapegoating framework.
66 Calabresi, supra note 1, at 86.
67 Carlson, 446 U.S. at 16 n.1.
68 Brief for the Respondent at 4, Carlson, 446 U.S. 14 (No. 78-1261), 1979 WL 199272,
at *4.
69 Id. at *10 n.4, *14 n.10.
70 Michael Tonry & Matthew Melewski, The Malign Effects of Drug and Crime Control
Policies on Black Americans, 37 CRIME & JUST. 1, 24 (2008).
71 Id.
72 Campbell Gibson & Kay Jung, Historical Census Statistics on Population Totals by Race,
1790 to 1990, and by Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, for the United States, Regions, Divisions, and
States tbl.1 (U.S. Census Bureau, Population Div. Working Paper No. 56, 2002), https://
www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/working-papers/2002/demo/POP-
twps0056.pdf.
73 News Release, U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Census Shows America’s Diversity (Mar. 24,
2011), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/2010_census/cb11-
cn125.html.
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In Davis, the Supreme Court allowed a former congressional staffer to
bring a damages claim against the representative for whom she had worked
for firing her on the basis of sex in violation of the Fifth Amendment.74  One
could make a compelling case that there are ways in which American society
scapegoats women in the workforce to allow men to maintain professional
ascendency.75  But in Davis, the Court seems to have cared little about gen-
der equality qua gender equality, largely relegating the case’s egregious facts
to a footnote and saying almost nothing about sex discrimination more
broadly.76
Instead, the Court made clear that Davis stood as a synecdoche for
antidiscrimination ideals generally.  In reaffirming the Fifth Amendment’s
reverse incorporation of equal protection principles, the Court cited—and
thus suggested that the decision itself embraced—cases alleging not just gen-
der discrimination, but also race discrimination, noncitizen discrimination,
age discrimination, and more.77  And in emphasizing the history of granting
equitable relief against the federal government for discrimination claims, the
Court lingered on Bolling v. Sharpe, the famous companion case to Brown v.
Board of Education.78  Accordingly, while cases today characterize Davis as lim-
ited to suits alleging sex discrimination in congressional employment,79 the
74 Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 230–31, 248–49 (1979).
75 See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1759
(1998) (“Where sexual misconduct occurs, it is typically part of a broader pattern of harass-
ment designed to reinforce gender differences and to claim work competence and author-
ity as masculine preserves.”).
76 The footnote repeats the text of a letter the congressman sent the plaintiff to termi-
nate her employment. See Davis, 442 U.S. at 230–31 n.3 (stating, among other things, as
follows: “My Washington staff joins me in saying that we miss you very much.  But, in all
probability, inwardly they all agree that I was doing you an injustice by asking you to
assume a responsibility that was so trying and so hard that it would have taken all of the
pleasure out of your work.  I must be completely fair with you, so please note the following:
You are able, energetic and a very hard worker.  Certainly you command the respect of
those with whom you work; however, on account of the unusually heavy work load in my
Washington Office, and the diversity of the job, I concluded that it was essential that the
understudy to my Administrative Assistant be a man.  I believe you will agree with this
conclusion.”  (paragraph break omitted)).
77 See id. at 234 (“In numerous decisions, this Court ‘has held that the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment forbids the Federal Government to deny equal protection
of the laws.’” (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 95 n.1 (1979) (age/job-classification
discrimination)) (first citing Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976) (nonci-
tizen discrimination); then citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) (restrictions on
political-process access); then citing Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2
(1975) (gender discrimination); and then citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500
(1954) (race discrimination))).
78 See id. at 242–44.
79 See, e.g., Byrd v. Lamb, 990 F.3d 879, 882 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (describing
the suits permitted by Davis as involving “discrimination on the basis of sex by a congress-
man against a staff person in violation of the Fifth Amendment” (quoting Oliva v. Nivar,
973 F.3d 438, 442 (5th Cir. 2020))).
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Court appears to have seen Davis (and some lower-court judges saw Davis80)
as addressing unequal treatment more broadly—or at least as laying the
groundwork for future matters to do so.
The overarching connection to scapegoating concepts should be appar-
ent.  Scapegoating commonly manifests as discrimination against disadvan-
taged communities, for scapegoating “always help[s] the powerful,” to return
to Calabresi’s speech.81  The Court’s equal protection jurisprudence seeks to
guard against just such invidious group-based treatment.  It may be easy for
the majority to consign what the Court famously called “discrete and insular
minorities” to scapegoat status, a danger that equal protection principles can
address.82  Or the animus that violates equal protection doctrine outside the
classification analysis could signal that scapegoating is afoot,83 to provide just
a couple examples.
Other rights provisions are similar, of course, in the countermajoritarian
sense that a primary purpose is to prevent unjustified incursions on the lib-
erty interests of people without much political power.  The point is not that
all individual constitutional injuries, or even all equal protection violations,
necessarily represent instances of social scapegoating.84  The point is instead
that the one likely correlates with the other in a great many cases—and that
since this overlap seems especially probable in the equal protection context,
a decision like Davis aimed at discrimination generally may well represent a
response to scapegoating concerns.
80 See Wallace v. Chappell, 661 F.2d 729, 730 n.1, 738 (9th Cir. 1981) (recognizing a
Bivens action for racial discrimination in military activities on the ground that Davis
“extended” Bivens “to fifth amendment equal protection claims” but remanding for an
additional reviewability analysis), rev’d on other grounds, 462 U.S. 296 (1983); Marshall v.
Kleppe, 637 F.2d 1217, 1219 (9th Cir. 1980) (recognizing a Bivens action for racial discrim-
ination in lending on the ground that after Davis, “there is no longer any doubt that an
individual may assert a private cause of action for damages, based on an alleged violation
of the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause, against a federal official”).
81 Calabresi, supra note 1, at 88.
82 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938); see Dan T.
Coenen, The Future of Footnote Four, 41 GA. L. REV. 797, 798–99 (2007) (“The Supreme
Court’s decision in United States v. Carolene Products Co. generated the most famous foot-
note—and perhaps the most famous passage—in all of the American Judiciary’s treatment
of constitutional law.”).
83 See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 770 (2013) (“The Constitution’s guaran-
tee of equality ‘must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a
politically unpopular group cannot’ justify disparate treatment of that group.”  (quoting
U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973))).
84 Much but not all free speech precedent would seem difficult to cast in that light, for
example. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 192–93 (2014) (plurality opinion)
(striking down “aggregate limits” on campaign contributions, which “restrict[ ] how much
money a donor may contribute in total to all candidates or committees,” as violating the
First Amendment).
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II. LATER CASES AS AN INSTANCE OF SCAPEGOATING
The foregoing discussion suggests that we can see the earlier Bivens
cases—the ones that expanded the doctrine—as responding to social
scapegoating.  But what about the later Bivens cases?
In his commencement address, Judge Calabresi claimed that “lawless-
ness breeds lawlessness and scapegoats.”85  Lawyers can help break this cycle,
Calabresi said, by harnessing the rule of law to address root problems.
Because “the law fails, often perhaps even usually, the law fails,” he contin-
ued, “the temptation is to abandon it, to act lawlessly, to scapegoat.”86  But
“lawlessness and scapegoatism” as a response “always fail” and “always lead us
to harm.”87  So, Calabresi concluded, “[t]he only hope, despite the failure of
law, is in law—in systemic careful reform of law, in solutions to underlying
problems, not in scapegoatism.”88
There is a great deal of disagreement about whether the initial line of
Bivens decisions was itself lawless (or at least unlawful)—and in particular,
about whether these cases comply with a correct understanding of the consti-
tutional separation of powers between federal courts and Congress.  The pre-
sent Part aims not to resolve this disagreement, but instead to point out that
even for people who think the earlier Bivens jurisprudence was erroneous,
the Supreme Court’s response has been problematic.  Indeed, we can see the
later Bivens jurisprudence itself as an act of scapegoating against a conve-
nient target, arguably continuing through concealment the cycle against
which Calabresi warned.  The present Part also discusses a potential correc-
tive course.
A. Convenience
In a long string of cases since Carlson came down in 1980, the Supreme
Court has refused to extend the Bivens remedy to additional constitutional or
factual circumstances.89  The stated reason is that creating causes of action is
a task for Congress, not the courts.  And the Justices have been quite critical
of how their predecessors approached this area of law.
85 Calabresi, supra note 1, at 87; see also id. at 88 (“Rodney King broke the law, and so
some cops decided to act lawlessly.  A jury in trying those cops may well have acted law-
lessly.  I believe they, the first jury, did.  And the rioters responded to that lawlessness by
acting lawlessly.  And, as a result, some Korean shopkeepers and some African-American
shopkeepers, were the ones who ended up being the scapegoats of all that lawlessness.”).
86 Id. at 88.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 See Hernández v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 743 (2020) (first citing Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137
S. Ct. 1843 (2017); then citing Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118 (2012); then citing Wilkie
v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007); then citing Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61
(2001); then citing FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994); then citing Schweiker v. Chilicky,
487 U.S. 412 (1988); then citing United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987); then citing
Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983); and then citing Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367
(1983)).
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The Court’s two most recent Bivens cases provide ample illustration.
“[I]t is a significant step under separation-of-powers principles for a court to
determine that it has the authority, under the judicial power, to create and
enforce a cause of action for damages against federal officials in order to
remedy a constitutional violation,” the Court said in the 2017 case Ziglar v.
Abbasi.90  For “[i]t is not necessarily a judicial function to establish whole
categories of cases in which federal officers must defend against personal
liability claims in the complex sphere of litigation.”91
Last year’s decision in Hernández v. Mesa spoke even more sternly about
the Court’s previous practices.  After Carlson, the Court said, “we came to
appreciate more fully the tension” between recognizing implied damages
actions on one hand “and the Constitution’s separation of legislative and
judicial power” on the other.92  While Abbasi called it “possible that the analy-
sis in the Court’s three Bivens cases might have been different if they were
decided today,”93 Hernández designated it “doubtful that we would have
reached the same result.”94  And while Abbasi stated that “this opinion is not
intended to cast doubt on the continued force, or even the necessity, of Biv-
ens in the search-and-seizure context in which it arose,”95 Hernández included
no such qualification.  Both cases criticized the initial line of Bivens decisions
as belonging to an “ancien regime.”96  And Hernández repeated Abbasi’s state-
ment that “expansion of Bivens is ‘a “disfavored” judicial activity.’”97
Those were just the lead opinions.  Both Abbasi and Hernández featured
separate opinions blaming Bivens and its successors on bad judging.  In
Abbasi, Justice Thomas reiterated his previously expressed view that “Bivens is
a relic of the heady days in which this Court assumed common-law powers to
create causes of action,” such that “Bivens and its progeny” should be limited
“to the precise circumstances that they involved.”98  In Hernández, Justice
Thomas—this time joined by Justice Gorsuch—contended that “[t]o ensure
that we are not ‘perpetuat[ing] a usurpation of the legislative power,’” the
Court should “consider discarding the Bivens doctrine altogether.”99  Indeed,
the concurrence concluded, “[t]he analysis underlying Bivens cannot be
defended.”100
90 137 S. Ct. at 1856.
91 Id. at 1858.
92 Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 741.
93 Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1856.
94 Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 742–43 (describing Abbasi’s statement).
95 Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1856.
96 Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 741 (quoting Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1855); Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at
1855 (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001)).
97 Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 742 (quoting Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857).
98 Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1869–70 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (quoting Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 568 (2007) (Thomas, J.,
concurring)).
99 Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 750 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Gamble v. United
States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1984 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring)).
100 Id. at 752.
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So the Roberts Court condemns the Burger Court’s practice of relying
on legislative-like reasoning to make policy judgments about the availability
of constitutional causes of action.  As even a prominent conservative judge
has recently suggested, however, there are plausible historical arguments that
the earlier Bivens cases were not as far out of conventional remedial bounds
as the later Bivens cases suggest.101  To quote Steve Vladeck (who repre-
sented the petitioner in Hernández): “At the Founding, and for much of
American history, there was no question as to whether federal courts had the
power to provide judge-made damages remedies against individual federal
officers.”102  Indeed, Vladeck contends that “[r]emedies against federal
officers were . . . not viewed as being committed to the states’ grace, and the
Court suggested that in some cases ‘the existence of the common law tort
action for certain types of official invasions of liberty or property may itself be
a constitutional requirement.’”103  Even in Bivens, Vladeck continues, “the
solicitor general agreed that federal courts had the power—and obligation—
to fashion such relief on their own” to the extent “a federal remedy was nec-
essary to vindicate a plaintiff’s constitutional rights” and that federal courts
“had been doing so for decades.”104
Nevertheless, the Court has steadfastly refused to engage with these
arguments on their own terms (to the extent it has engaged with them at all).
For instance, the Court has never fully grappled with how its hostility to
implied damages remedies fits with its acceptance of implied injunctive relief
for constitutional wrongs.105  This failure is especially striking given that Jus-
tice Harlan’s famous concurrence in Bivens repeatedly leaned on the availa-
bility of unwritten equitable actions to justify allowing unwritten damages
101 See Byrd v. Lamb, 990 F.3d 879, 884 & n.11 (5th Cir. 2021) (Willett, J., specially
concurring) (noting that “Justices Thomas and Gorsuch have called for Bivens to be over-
ruled, contending it lacks any historical basis,” but that “[s]ome constitutional scholars
counter that judge-made tort remedies against lawless federal officers date back to the
Founding”) (collecting citations).
102 Stephen I. Vladeck, The Disingenuous Demise and Death of Bivens, 2019–2020 CATO
SUP. CT. REV. 263, 267.
103 Id. at 270 (quoting Ann Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of Constitutionally
Compelled Remedies, 107 YALE L.J. 77, 121 (1997)).
104 Id. at 271.
105 E.g., Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 327 (2015) (“The abil-
ity to sue to enjoin unconstitutional actions by state and federal officers is the creation of
courts of equity, and reflects a long history of judicial review of illegal executive action,
tracing back to England.  It is a judge-made remedy . . . .”  (citation omitted)); see Gene R.
Nichol, Bivens, Chilicky, and Constitutional Damages Claims, 75 VA. L. REV. 1117, 1135
(1989) (“[T]he present juxtaposition of a hesitancy to grant damages awards with a willing-
ness to allow injunctive relief . . . gets the traditional interplay between law and equity
exactly backwards.  Equitable remedies . . . are normally available only after legal remedies
have been demonstrated inadequate. . . . The implication is not ambiguous.  The common
law tradition’s first remedial response to the deprivation of a legal interest was the fashion-
ing of an award for damages.”  (footnotes omitted)).
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actions too.106  The Court, moreover, has fastened its turn away from the
initial Bivens decisions onto the notion that Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins
“held that ‘[t]here is no federal general common law,’” such that “federal
courts today cannot fashion new claims in the way that they could before
1938.”107  But the Court has essentially ignored arguments that “Erie had no
effect on the tort liability of rogue federal officers other than to clarify that
federal courts were bound by judge-made state law in diversity cases.”108
Regardless of how one comes down on whether damages relief for constitu-
tional claims represents an appropriate place for common-law decisionmak-
ing by federal courts, the issue is far more nuanced than the Justices’ bare
Erie invocation acknowledges.109
As it turns out, Bivens appears to provide the Court a convenient bogey-
man because—generally, not universally, speaking—the same Justices who
have opposed the regime have often opposed robust recovery in constitu-
tional tort law more broadly.  Perhaps most pertinent nowadays, several of
the same Justices who have recently criticized the availability of Bivens relief
have also supported a superstrong version of qualified immunity.110  And
many of the same Justices who have historically criticized the availability of
Bivens relief have embraced increased pleading standards,111 administrative
106 See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 404 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he presumed availability of
federal equitable relief against threatened invasions of constitutional interests appears
entirely to negate the contention that the status of an interest as constitutionally protected
divests federal courts of the power to grant damages absent express congressional
authorization.”).
107 Hernández v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 742 (2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Erie
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)).
108 Brief for the Petitioners at 14–15, Hernández, 140 S. Ct. 735 (No. 17-1678), 2019 WL
3714475, at *14–15; see also Carlos M. Vázquez & Stephen I. Vladeck, State Law, the Westfall
Act, and the Nature of the Bivens Question, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 541 (2013) (“After Erie,
Courts addressing the question of damages for constitutional violations could have framed
the question as whether the previously available ‘common law’ remedies should now be
understood to have the status of federal common law.  Because the availability of such
remedies had been determined by federal courts largely independently of state decisions,
and given the obvious federal interests involved, the federal courts’ pre-Erie approach
could easily and properly have been retained and recharacterized in post-Erie terms as the
application of a federal common law of remedies for constitutional violations.”).
109 See generally Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common Law,
39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (1964); Caleb Nelson, The Legitimacy of (Some) Federal Common Law,
101 VA. L. REV. 1 (2015).
110 See, e.g., Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1866–67 (2017).
111 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 684 (2009) (extending to the constitutional
tort context and beyond the plausibility pleading standard announced in Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)).
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exhaustion mandates,112 municipal liability limitations,113 and other rules
favoring defendants in constitutional tort cases.114
This in itself is neither surprising nor scandalous.  Different Justices have
different views on life, law, and constitutional enforcement.  Those com-
monly regarded as liberal are more likely to support plaintiff-friendly consti-
tutional tort doctrine; those commonly regarded as conservative, defendant-
friendly constitutional tort doctrine.  Consistency of outcome does not in
itself indict any particular preference on any particular issue.  But consistency
of outcome, especially where combined with repeated refusals to take serious
counterarguments seriously, should cause analysts to question proffered justi-
fications premised on transsubstantive principles—like the disapproval of
judicial lawmaking on which the Court has grounded its Bivens resistance.
B. Concealment
With all the above in mind, it is worth asking to what extent the current
Supreme Court majority practices what its Bivens decisions preach about the
evils of judicial lawmaking.  The answer is arguably not much.  True, the
Court no longer recognizes implied damages actions in the context of fed-
eral statutes, instead “interpret[ing] the statute Congress has passed to deter-
mine whether it displays an intent to create not just a private right but also a
private remedy.”115  In some ways, however, the previous practice looked less
like an exercise in purposeful common-law decisionmaking than a capacious
approach to purposive statutory interpretation.116  In any event, additional
areas in which the Court continues to make federal common law are
numerous.
Even Justice Thomas acknowledges “enclaves of federal judge-made law”
governing “foreign affairs,” “disputes between States,” “admiralty,” “certain
rights and obligations of the United States,” and “aspects of federal labor
law.”117  But there are many more contexts in which something that looks
like federal common law controls.  As I explain elsewhere, for instance, there
is a lengthy “list of rules that have been identified as possibly prudential”—
meaning characterized as judicially “self-imposed, common law limit[s] on
112 See Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 532–36 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(arguing that exhaustion of state administrative remedies should be required under 42
U.S.C. § 1983).
113 See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60–62 (2011) (setting a high bar for failure-
to-train claims against municipalities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
114 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (rejecting the possibility of supervisory liability in constitu-
tional tort suits).
115 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286–87 (2001) (“Statutory intent on this latter
point is determinative.  Without it, a cause of action does not exist and courts may not
create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible
with the statute.”  (citations omitted)).
116 See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964) (“[I]t is the duty of the courts to
be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional
purpose.”).
117 Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1679 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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federal jurisdiction designed to foster core values like federalism, separation
of powers, and accuracy”118—in the federal courts field.119  Pulling just from
“a sampling of recent scholarship examining doctrines that the Supreme
Court or some of its members have treated as prudential,” these rules include
the “general prohibition against third-party standing,” the “zone-of-interests
standing test as applied to constitutional claims,” the “standing prohibition
on asserting generalized grievances,” the “taxpayer-standing doctrine,” the
“standing rule for federal-question cases about domestic relations,” the “ripe-
ness doctrine examining the fitness of the issues for review and the hardship
to the parties of delay,” certain “aspects of mootness,” the “adverseness
requirement,” certain “aspects of the political-question doctrine,” the
“abstention doctrines,” certain “aspects of state sovereign immunity,” and the
“act-of-state doctrine.”120  The infamous government-contractor defense also
comes to mind.121
To be sure, the Court often vaguely characterizes these doctrines as
rooted in constitutional principles.  But so did Bivens for constitutional dam-
ages claims.122  Some of these lines of decision, moreover, may be more justi-
fiable on historical or structural grounds than others are.  What matters for
the moment is that the Court itself has never articulated a convincing theory
of federal common-law decisionmaking that would distinguish the much-
maligned Bivens regime from the bulk of judicially fashioned doctrines bear-
ing little to no connection to constitutional or statutory text.
Perhaps starkest of all is the Court’s divergent treatment of the Bivens
analysis and the qualified immunity inquiry—even in a single case.  On the
Bivens analysis, Abbasi said that “[w]hen an issue ‘involves a host of considera-
tions that must be weighed and appraised,’ it should be committed to ‘those
118 Fred O. Smith, Jr., Undemocratic Restraint, 70 VAND. L. REV. 845, 853 (2017).
119 Katherine Mims Crocker, A Prudential Take on a Prudential Takings Doctrine, 117
MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 39, 50 (2018).
120 Id. (first citing Smith, supra note 118, at 855–69; and then citing Ernest A. Young,
Prudential Standing After Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 10
DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 149, 150–63 (2014)).
121 See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988) (admitting that the analy-
sis concerned “federal law of a content prescribed . . . by the courts—so-called ‘federal
common law’”); see also, e.g., Paul Lund, The Decline of Federal Common Law, 76 B.U. L. REV.
895, 960, 962–63 (1996) (arguing that “[u]pon reading the majority’s opinion in Boyle, it is
hard to escape the conclusion that the Court exercised power that the Constitution
reserves to Congress”).
122 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
397 (1971) (“The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individ-
ual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.” (quoting Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803))); id. at 407 (Harlan, J., concurring in the
judgment) (“[T]he judiciary has a particular responsibility to assure the vindication of con-
stitutional interests such as those embraced by the Fourth Amendment. . . . [T]he Bill of
Rights is particularly intended to vindicate the interests of the individual in the face of the
popular will as expressed in legislative majorities . . . .”).
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who write the laws’ rather than ‘those who interpret them.’”123  For we
should be skeptical, the Court said, about judges trying to mediate between
placing “burdens on some”—like the monetary costs accompanying “defense
and indemnification” and “the time and administrative costs attendant upon
intrusions resulting from the discovery and trial process”—and giving “bene-
fits to others.”124
On the qualified immunity question, by contrast, Abbasi said that the
judicially crafted doctrine, which allows constitutional tort plaintiffs to
recover damages only for “clearly established” rights violations,125 “seeks a
proper balance between two competing interests.”126  For “[o]n one hand,”
the Court continued, “damages suits ‘may offer the only realistic avenue for
vindication of constitutional guarantees.’”127  But “[o]n the other hand, . . .
damages suits . . . can entail substantial social costs, including the risk that
fear of personal monetary liability and harassing litigation will unduly inhibit
officials in the discharge of their duties.”128  In the interest of “accom-
modat[ing] these two objectives,” Abbasi explained, the Court had instituted
qualified immunity to “give[ ] officials ‘breathing room to make reasonable
but mistaken judgments about open legal questions.’”129
To quote Jim Pfander, the Court exhibits a “Janus-faced attitude to the
business of judicial lawmaking” by “express[ing] a grave reluctance to recog-
nize what it chooses to characterize as new rights of action under Bivens”
while “embrac[ing] judge-made law with gusto in adapting the rules of quali-
fied immunity” and other doctrines.130  But again, the Court rarely admits
the extent to which some areas depend on its own common-law decisionmak-
ing.  Instead, the Court purports to ground all manner of justiciability doc-
trines in a loose interpretation of Article III,131 relies on longstanding legal
text to discover newfangled procedural hurdles for plaintiffs to overcome,132
123 Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017) (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367,
380 (1983)).
124 Id. at 1856, 1858.
125 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
126 Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1866.
127 Id. (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814).
128 Id. (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987)).
129 Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011)).
130 James E. Pfander, Iqbal, Bivens, and the Role of Judge-Made Law in Constitutional Liti-
gation, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1387, 1405 (2010); see also Katherine Mims Crocker, Qualified
Immunity and Constitutional Structure, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1405, 1446–47 (2019) (laying out
the above passages from Abbasi and stating that they are “in some tension” because “[t]he
Court’s tone suggests . . . that it is largely illegitimate for the judiciary to determine which
claims should proceed based on competing cost considerations in the Bivens context but
perfectly fine for it to do the same thing in the qualified-immunity context”).
131 See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006) (“The doctrines of
mootness, ripeness, and political question all originate in Article III’s ‘case’ or ‘contro-
versy’ language, no less than standing does.”).
132 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684, 678 (2009) (extending to the constitu-
tional tort context and beyond the plausibility pleading standard announced in Bell Atlan-
tic Corp. v. Twombly, which the dissent in that case described as “announc[ing] a significant
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and even with respect to qualified immunity—where Justices have occasion-
ally been forthcoming about the subjective nature of their handiwork133—
casts about for a dizzying array of constitutional, statutory, and other
justifications.134
All this obfuscation of the discretion underlying the Justices’ federal
courts jurisprudence works a real concealment of the Bivens regime’s relative
unremarkableness.  To be sure, there are plausible distinctions between
these areas of law.  But it would be difficult if not impossible to deny that the
Court has adopted dramatically different tones toward discretionary doc-
trines that allow lawsuits and that disallow lawsuits—and especially lawsuits
against government actors.
The current Supreme Court condemns the Bivens regime as an area of
illegitimate common-law decisionmaking despite relying on similar reasoning
styles in a variety of other contexts.  Indeed, the same pattern carries over
into how more recent Justices have handled Bivens matters themselves.  In
the same cases where it has castigated judicial lawmaking, the Court has
repeatedly manipulated doctrinal factors without admitting as much and in a
way that seems related more to the majority’s subjective disdain for lawsuits
against government defendants than to any objective source of law.  In some
ways, that is, the Court’s approach now looks much like its predecessor’s
approach during the Bivens regime’s brief rise: the thumb is just on the other
side of the scale, with the earlier cases weighted toward and the later cases
weighted against allowing relief.
Consider the “special factors” inquiry.  This aspect of the analysis traces
back to Bivens itself, where the Court stated that “[t]he present case involves
no special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action
by Congress.”135  The list of factors the Court has deemed relevant has grown
over time.  But recently, the Justices have also framed the issue in such a
broad way that the exception essentially swallows the rule.  As Hernández put
it, “We have not attempted to ‘create an exhaustive list’ of factors that may
provide a reason not to extend Bivens, but we have explained that ‘central to
[this] analysis’ are ‘separation-of-powers principles.’”136  Accordingly, the
new rule that does not even purport to respond to any congressional command,” 550 U.S.
544, 596 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
133 See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 611–12 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“We
find ourselves engaged . . . in the essentially legislative activity of crafting a sensible scheme
of qualified immunities . . . .”); Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 171 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (stating that the Court had “depart[ed] from history in the name of public
policy, reshaping immunity doctrines in light of those policy considerations”).
134 See Crocker, supra note 130, at 1415–19 (summarizing scholarship surrounding sev-
eral asserted justifications).
135 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
396 (1971); see also Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980) (stating that a Bivens claim
“may be defeated” if “defendants demonstrate ‘special factors counselling hesitation in the
absence of affirmative action by Congress’” (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396)).
136 Hernández v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 743 (2020) (alteration in original) (quoting
Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017)).
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Court said, we “consider the risk of interfering with the authority of the other
branches, and we ask . . . ‘whether the Judiciary is well suited, absent congres-
sional action or instruction, to consider and weigh the costs and benefits of
allowing a damages action to proceed.’”137
For the current Court, these questions appear to have predetermined
answers.  One could hardly doubt that the majority believes it would always
“interfer[e] with the authority of the other branches” to recognize new Biv-
ens claims.138  One could hardly doubt that the majority believes the judiciary
is never “well suited, absent congressional action or instruction, to consider
and weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed”
under the Bivens framework.139  These precepts, after all, are the very foun-
dation on which the Court has rested its repudiation of implied damages
remedies.140  It should come as little surprise, therefore, to see a lower court
pretermit even a peek at the details of a particular case by saying that the lack
of a statutory damages remedy—the basis for the Bivens analysis in the first
place—itself constitutes a special factor sufficient to reject a constitutional
claim.141  For the Justices have set up a system that encourages courts to go
through the motions of considering Bivens actions while essentially
instructing courts that they violate the Constitution by in fact considering
Bivens actions.
The Court’s about-face as to alternative remedies is also instructive.  In
the earlier Bivens cases, the absence of alternative remedies was a reason for
137 Id. (quoting Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1858).
138 Id.; see id. at 742 (“[A] federal court’s authority to recognize a damages remedy
must rest at bottom on a statute enacted by Congress, and no statute expressly creates a
Bivens remedy.” (citation omitted)).
139 Id. at 743 (quoting Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1858); see id. at 742 (“We have recognized
that Congress is best positioned to evaluate ‘whether, and the extent to which, monetary
and other liabilities should be imposed upon individual officers and employees of the Fed-
eral Government’ based on constitutional torts.” (quoting Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1856)).
140 See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286–87 (2001) (“Like substantive federal
law itself, private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress. . . .
Without [statutory intent to create not just a private right but also a private remedy], a
cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that
might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute.  ‘Raising up causes of
action where a statute has not created them may be a proper function for common-law
courts, but not for federal tribunals.’” (quoting Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow
v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 365 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment))).
141 See Byrd v. Lamb, 990 F.3d 879, 882 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (“We must . . .
determine whether any special factors counsel against extending Bivens.  Here, . . . separa-
tion of powers counsels against extending Bivens.  Congress did not make individual
officers statutorily liable for excessive-force or unlawful-detention claims, and the ‘silence
of Congress is relevant.’  This special factor gives us ‘reason to pause’ before extending
Bivens.” (citation omitted) (first quoting Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1862; and then quoting Her-
nández, 140 S. Ct. at 743)); see also Oliva v. Nivar, 973 F.3d 438, 444 (5th Cir. 2020) (“[T]he
separation of powers is itself a special factor.”), petition for cert. filed, No. 20-1060 (U.S. Jan.
29, 2021).
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allowing claims to proceed: recall the famous line from Justice Harlan’s Biv-
ens concurrence that “[f]or people in Bivens’ shoes, it is damages or noth-
ing.”142  In the later Bivens cases, the absence of alternative remedies has
been recharacterized as a reason against allowing claims to proceed.143  In
the earlier Bivens cases, moreover, the presence of alternative remedies could
defeat claims only if Congress “explicitly declared” the remedies “substi-
tute[s] for recovery directly under the Constitution” and saw them as “equally
effective.”144  But in the later Bivens cases, the presence (or even the possible
presence) of alternative remedies can defeat claims regardless of whether
Congress has deemed them equally effective replacements for constitutional
tort actions.145  Under this logic, Bivens actions may be damned if Congress
does and damned if Congress does not provide some other avenue for
redress.
These are just a couple examples of how the Court has repeatedly refash-
ioned the standards applicable to Bivens suits to conform to the majority’s
apparent preference for precluding actions against government defendants.
Joanna Schwartz, Alex Reinert, and Jim Pfander provide another possible
example in their contribution to this symposium issue, arguing that the
“exemption for policy challenges” articulated in Abbasi “can claim no support
in the Court’s own development of the Bivens doctrine, or in the principles
142 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
410 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment); see supra text accompanying note 38;
see also Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 245 (1979) (providing as a reason that “a damages
remedy is surely appropriate in this case” the fact that “there are available no other alterna-
tive forms of judicial relief”).
143 See Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 749 (“This pattern of congressional action—refraining
from authorizing damages actions for injury inflicted abroad by Government officers, while
providing alternative avenues for compensation in some situations—gives us further rea-
son to hesitate about extending Bivens in this case.”); Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1863 (“[I]n any
inquiry respecting the likely or probable intent of Congress, the silence of Congress is
relevant; and here that silence is telling.  In the almost 16 years since September 11, the
Federal Government’s responses to that terrorist attack have been well documented. . . .
Nevertheless, ‘[a]t no point did Congress choose to extend to any person the kind of
remedies that respondents seek in this lawsuit.’” (quoting Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S.
412, 426 (1988)).
144 Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18–19 (1980); see also Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397 (“[W]e
have here no explicit congressional declaration that persons injured by a federal officer’s
violation of the Fourth Amendment may not recover money damages from the agents, but
must instead be remitted to another remedy, equally effective in the view of Congress.”).
145 See Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1862–63 (“It is of central importance, too, that this is not a
case like Bivens or Davis in which ‘it is damages or nothing.’ . . . To address th[e] kinds of
[policy] decisions [at issue here], detainees may seek injunctive relief.  And in addition to
that, we have left open the question whether they might be able to challenge their confine-
ment conditions via a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.” (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410
(Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment))); id. at 1863 (“[W]hen alternative methods of
relief are available, a Bivens remedy usually is not.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-5\NDL508.txt unknown Seq: 24 11-MAY-21 9:03
1966 notre dame law review [vol. 96:5
that animate the Court’s broader approach to government accountability
law.”146
C. Correction
For what does all this count from the standpoint of a concern about
scapegoating?  Recall that scapegoating can allow in-groups to sidestep social
problems by casting blame onto out-groups instead of confronting such
problems—and the in-groups’ complicity in perpetuating them—directly.
Something like that seems to have happened here, with the later Supreme
Court eluding larger questions about the proper scope of common-law deci-
sionmaking in federal courts by focusing so much disapproval on the discrete
Bivens doctrine.  Indeed, the kind of collective purging that arises where the
censuring entity has itself been involved in the conduct at issue—like the
Soviet government punishing a handful of Chernobyl bureaucrats for sins of
the bigger system147—represents an especially harmful form of scapegoating.
Today’s Justices reprimand their forerunners for engaging in a practice that
still appears to pervade the Court’s jurisprudence not only beyond, but also
within the Bivens context itself.  Even for people inclined to agree with the
later Court’s assessment of the earlier Bivens cases, therefore, the current
methodological approach should be no way to run a railroad.148
A potentially more productive implication relates to Judge Calabresi’s
encouragement to channel the rule of law to break the scapegoating cycle.  A
civil justice system in which federal officials can violate constitutional rights
with virtual impunity is no civil justice system at all.  Accordingly, congres-
sional codification of Bivens-type claims would seem like the kind of “deeper
structural solution” (or at least a step toward the kind of “deeper structural
solution”) that Judge Calabresi urged the legal community to pursue.149
One problem, however, is that the Court’s current approach to the Bivens
analysis may obscure the need for congressional intervention.  There is rea-
son to worry that because the Court purports to have preserved a path for
some amorphous class of new Bivens claims to proceed, the fact that it has
tried simultaneously to erect insurmountable obstacles to traversing that path
may not be obvious enough to casual observers—and, therefore, may not
generate the level of political pushback necessary to force meaningful
reform.
Another parallel from the qualified immunity context is worth tracing
here.  While surreptitiously strengthening the doctrine’s protections for gov-
146 Joanna C. Schwartz, Alexander Reinert & James E. Pfander, Going Rogue: The
Supreme Court’s Newfound Hostility to Policy-Based Bivens Claims, 96 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1835,
1835 (2021).
147 See supra text accompanying note 14.
148 Pun intended. See supra text accompanying note 66. A Bivens opponent might
respond that because Bivens and its immediate successors were wrongly decided, the Court
is justified in acting creatively to chip away at the doctrine.  For a reply to thinking along
these lines, see Crocker, supra note 130, at 1442–46.
149 Calabresi, supra note 1, at 89.
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ernment defendants over time,150 the Court consistently refused to declare
any constitutional right “clearly established” from 2004 through 2020,151 tak-
ing a large toll on constitutional tort claims throughout the federal court
system.152  Nevertheless, it took years for a critical mass of commentators to
sound the alarm—and it took the vast movement for police reform and racial
justice following George Floyd’s death for the public to get behind the kind
of campaign required to spur even the possibility of policy change.153  The
fact that the Court swept the real effects of its qualified immunity decisions
under the rug by maintaining a veneer of receptivity to constitutional tort
claims likely prolonged the reckoning now taking place.154  It is easy to per-
ceive a similar pattern in Bivens jurisprudence, pushing the possibility of con-
gressional correction further into the future, and perhaps further out of
reach, than the reality of the situation demands.
One partial solution would be for the Court to reduce the urgency of
external action by more faithfully applying the earlier Bivens framework.  But
that seems unlikely any time soon.  Alternatively, the Court could be more
candid about what it seems to be doing.  Without overruling the earlier Biv-
ens cases, the Court could say in actual words what its decisions have long said
between the lines: “this far and no further.”155  To be clear, I do not think
damages claims for constitutional violations against federal officials should
be limited to the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendment contexts of Bivens,
Davis, and Carlson (or to the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendment contexts
150 See Crocker, supra note 130, at 1414–15. See generally Kit Kinports, The Supreme
Court’s Quiet Expansion of Qualified Immunity, 100 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 62, 64 (2016).
151 See Katherine Mims Crocker, The Supreme Court’s Reticent Qualified Immunity Retreat,
71 DUKE L.J. ONLINE (forthcoming 2021) (on file with author).
152 See Andrew Chung, Lawrence Hurley, Jackie Botts, Andrea Januta & Guillermo
Gomez, For Cops Who Kill, Special Supreme Court Protection, REUTERS (May 8, 2020), https://
www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-police-immunity-scotus/ (reporting
based on “an unprecedented analysis of appellate court records” that “[e]ven as the
proliferation of police body cameras and bystander cellphone video has turned a national
spotlight on extreme police tactics, qualified immunity, under the careful stewardship of
the Supreme Court, is making it easier for officers to kill or injure civilians with impunity”).
153 See Crocker, supra note 151 (describing the history of the pushback against qualified
immunity).
154 See Kinports, supra note 150, at 78 (“In recent years, the Supreme Court opinions
applying the qualified immunity defense have engaged in a pattern of describing the
defense in increasingly generous terms and qualifying and deviating from past prece-
dent—without offering any justification or even acknowledgement of the Court’s depar-
ture from prior case law.”).
155 To quote Justice Alito, Hernández’s author, “we may say that a certain precedent
goes this far and no further, even though you can make the argument that the logic of the
decision ought to extend much further.”  Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Michael W. McConnell,
Kenneth W. Starr, Walter E. Dellinger III & Douglas W. Kmiec, The Second Conversation with
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr.: Lawyering and the Craft of Judicial Opinion Writing, 37 PEPP. L. REV.
33, 53 (2009).  For “to say it goes this far and no further isn’t overruling that decision,”
Alito continued, and “[i]t’s not being disingenuous in distinguishing that case.” Id. at 53–54
(emphasis added).  Instead, he concluded: “It’s just saying that it has its limits.  We’re draw-
ing a limit.” Id. at 54.
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at all).  If that is the message the Court intends to convey, though, perhaps
that is the message it should provide to the public, not just to insiders adept
at reading coded legal opinions.  Increased judicial candor can bring inde-
pendent and cross-contextual benefits for the entire judicial system.156  But
in the present predicament, increased judicial candor could also help redi-
rect reform efforts from federal courts to the other branches of govern-
ment—and help crystallize these efforts’ overall importance to improving
government accountability.  There are strong—and on balance, compel-
ling—counterarguments against cutting off the possibility of new Bivens
claims.  Most importantly, the existing framework still allows some good-faith
argumentation that judges should recognize Bivens actions.  Lower courts
occasionally do just that, permitting the possibility of monetary compensa-
tion for constitutional wrongs that may otherwise go unremedied.157  And
the Justices could someday swing back toward a willingness to provide plain-
tiffs relief—a prospect that preserving the present path would simplify.
At the very least, therefore, judges, scholars, and other commentators
who care about increasing accountability for civil rights violations should
spotlight the implications of the Court’s later Bivens jurisprudence in service
of calls for congressional reform.  Judge Don Willett provided a prime exam-
ple in a recent Fifth Circuit concurrence.  Writing that “[m]iddle-manage-
ment circuit judges must salute smartly and follow precedent,” he said the
panel’s refusal to recognize the plaintiff’s excessive force and unlawful
seizure claims was “precedentially inescapable.”158  Walking through the doc-
trine’s history, he reasoned that “Bivens today is essentially a relic, technically
on the books but practically a dead letter.”159  But Congress, he continued,
“certainly knows how to provide a damages action for unconstitutional con-
duct,” and its failure to do so here despite allowing damages claims for con-
stitutional violations against state and local officials “seems innately
unjust.”160  Accordingly, Judge Willett concluded, “I add my voice to those
156 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Theory of Judicial Candor, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2265,
2280–87 (2017) (asking and answering “[w]hat good reason do we have to care about
whether judges exhibit . . . judicial candor . . . ?” (italics omitted)); David L. Shapiro, In
Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 736–38 (1987) (asking and answering
“how strong is the case for candor in the performance of the judge’s job?”).
157 See, e.g., Dyer v. Smith, No. 3:19-cv-921, 2021 WL 694811, at *1 (E.D. Va. Feb. 23,
2021) (holding that “no special factors counsel against recognizing implied damages reme-
dies for either of [the plaintiff’s] claims” in a case “alleg[ing] that the defendants, both
TSA agents, violated [the plaintiff’s] First and Fourth Amendment rights when they
stopped him from recording a pat-down search of his husband and ordered him to delete
the video he had already taken”).  I filed an amicus brief in this case. See Brief of Amici
Curiae Professors Katherine Mims Crocker and Brandon Hasbrouck in Support of Neither
Party with Respect to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Dyer, 2021 WL 694811 (No. 3:19-cv-
921).
158 Byrd v. Lamb, 990 F.3d 879, 883 (5th Cir. 2021) (Willett, J., specially concurring).
159 Id. at 884.
160 Id.
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lamenting today’s rights-without-remedies regime, hoping (against hope)
that as the chorus grows louder, change comes sooner.”161
CONCLUSION
  “[L]awlessness breeds lawlessness and scapegoats,” Judge Calabresi said to
the graduating class of Quinnipiac University School of Law in 1993.162
Attempting to apply Calabresi’s teachings, this Essay has suggested that police
abuse, inequitable and other troublesome aspects of the criminal justice sys-
tem more broadly, and a wide range of equal protection violations most
broadly of all bred the Bivens regime, which many regard as lawless (or at
least unlawful).  The Essay has also suggested that the Bivens regime in turn
bred the scapegoat of its own ridicule and rejection by the later Supreme
Court, whose actions others likewise regard as lawless (or, again, at least
unlawful).
What could be done, at this late date, to break the scapegoating cycle?
What could be done, in the context of the constitutional tort system and the
primary conduct that undergirds it, to seek the kind of “deeper structural
solution” that Calabresi pressed his audience to pursue?163  Ultimately, this
Essay has argued, Congress should step in and create a statutory cause of
action for constitutional claims against federal officials.  In the meantime,
though, members of the legal community who care about increasing account-
ability for civil rights violations should continue calling attention to the
Court’s “rights-without-remedies regime.”164
Perhaps this Essay has just scratched the surface of ways in which the
Bivens regime and the rest of the Court’s constitutional tort jurisprudence
relate to the scapegoating model.  As I discuss elsewhere, for instance, the
Court’s application of sovereign immunity to damages suits in this context
inappropriately foists all the blame for some systemic problems onto individ-
ual officials rather than (also) holding the entities that employ them respon-
sible.165  One could characterize this as scapegoating too166—which both
qualified immunity and employer indemnification may tacitly acknowledge.
Deeper structural solutions are available here as well, including congres-
sional creation of entity liability alongside individual accountability for con-
stitutional violations.167  For now, though, the scapegoat theory of Bivens
outlined above provides a new perspective on the doctrine’s rise and
retrenchment—and on some modest steps toward reform.
161 Id. at 885.
162 Calabresi, supra note 1, at 87.
163 Id. at 89.
164 Byrd, 990 F.3d at 885 (Willett, J., specially concurring).
165 See generally Crocker, supra note 65.
166 See Richard Henry Seamon, U.S. Torture as a Tort, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 715, 799 (2006)
(“Bivens liability usually rolls downhill, attaching, if at all, to the ‘street-level’ officials who
actually inflict the injury that gives rise to the Bivens suit.  Those officials may appear as
scapegoats to the jury.” (footnote omitted)).
167 See Crocker, supra note 65 (manuscript at 43–59).
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